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This Article is about the constitutional right to privacy,
a right that many believe has little to do with privacy and nothing
to do with the Constitution. By all accounts, however, the right to
privacy has everything to do with delineating the legitimate limits
of governmental power. The right to privacy, like the natural law
and substantive due process doctrines for which it is a late-blooming
substitute, supposes that the very order of things in a free society
may on certain occasions render intolerable a law that violates no
express constitutional guarantee.
Privacy doctrine supposes too that the judiciary is an
appropriate body to determine whether a law transgresses these
implicit limits. This is a proposition that notoriously divides
conservatives and liberals; the side on which one will find either
group depends, of course, on the particular decade and the particular
legal issue one chooses to study. I will try to escape that debate
in what follows. The judiciary has always gone beyond the literal-
constitutional text2 o strike down legislation and no doubt will
continue to do so. - Whether this "activism" is to be explained by
1/ This article is excerpted from Jed Rubenfeld, "The Right of
Privacy," 102 Harvard Law Review 737 (February 1989), Copyright (c)
1989 by the Harvard Law Review Association, and is reprinted here
with permission. Most footnotes are omitted, and those retained have
been renumbered.
a/ "Despite claims to the contrary, there has been a period of time
wherein the Court did not actively enforce values which a majority of
the justices felt were essential in our society even though they had
no specific textual basis in the Constitution." 2 R. Rotunda, J.
Nowak & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law Section 15.7, at 79(1986) [hereinafter Treatise]. The magnitude of "non-textuality" in
established constitutional law--supposing that a "textual"/"non-
textual" distinction could be made coherent--extends of course far
beyond the right to privacy. Freedom of association, for example, is
nowhere mentioned in the constitutional text; nor are the prohibitions
of irrational legislation and state legislation that burdens ordiscriminates against interstate commerce. Moreover, the application
100 (Footnote Continued)
the irresistible urge of all officeholders to expand the power of
their office, by the meaninglessness of the idea of a "literal" text,
or by the Framers' original intent, we may leave the sociologists,
the literary critics, and the Attorney General's office to determine.
Moreover, rather than asking which political platform is most closely
affiliated with the decisions of a particular time, we ought to ask
another question: in its elaboration of implicit constitutional law,
is the judiciary genuinely freeing the individual from overreaching
state power? That is the self-conception with which the courts will
justify their decisions; that is the political vision to which
proponents of privacy law claim. Thus it is an apt criterion by
which to evaluate their work.
The laws struck down under the rubric of privacy have had a
peculiar tendency to gravitate around sexuality: the groundbreaking
cases involved contraception, marriage, and abortion. The signifi-
cance of this trend has been largely passed over in silence. Behind
this silence may lie an intuition or tacit agreement that sexuality
is an area of life into which the state has no business intruding.
To those who imagined that the privacy doctrine could be explained by
reference to some such intuition, Bowers v. Hardwick 3/ has star-
tlingly revealed the inadequacy of their position. 
--
Yet, even before Hardwick, few believed that the privacy
doctrine could be interpreted solely by reference to a principle
concerning sexuality. Instead the reigning explanatory concept has
been "personhood." Our personhood must remain inviolate: that is
(Footnote Continued)
of the Bill of Rights to state governments is nothing less than pure
"substantive due process," and the bedrock of all constitutional
law--the power of the Supreme Court to strike down a law deemed
constitutional by a state's highest court or by Congress--had itself
to be inferred. See Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803); infra note 13. This Article does not seek to defend non-
textual constitutional interpretation in general. The Conclusion,
however, suggests a constitutional basis for the right to privacy.
3/ 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4/ In Hardwick, the Court upheld against a right-to-privacy
challenge a state statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. See id.
at 195-96. The Court specifically rejected the position that the
right to privacy protected all "private sexual conduct between
consenting adults." See id. at 191.
what privacy protects; that is its principle. No serious critique of
the personhood idea has yet appeared.
Three overlapping inquiries are thus presented. The first
involves the validity of personhood as the principle by which to
explain and articulate the privacy doctrine; the second, the rela-
tions among privacy doctrine, sexuality, and the limits of state
power; and the third, the question of whether some principle other
than personhood might underlie the constitutional right to privacy.
This Article will address these three inquiries as follows.
Part I summarizes the development of the right-to-privacy case law.
[Part II, which offers a critique of the personhood principle, and
Part III, which purportedly advances a new way of conceiving,
explaining, and applying the privacy doctrine, have not been
reproduced.]
Hardwick has exposed deep flaws in the prevailing jurispru-
dence and ideology of privacy. The constitutional ground has shifted;
perhaps it is dissolving altogether. The changing membership of the
High Court raises the possibility of a wholesale reconsideration of
the privacy doctrine's propriety. Yet even when the doctrine was
first ascendant, the Court never hazarded a definitive statement of
what it was supposed to protect. At the heart of the right to
privacy, there has always been a conceptual vacuum.
The reason for this, I will try to show, is that the
operative analysis in privacy cases has invariably missed the real
point. Past privacy analysis has taken the act proscribed by the law
at issue--for example, abortion, interracial marriage, or homosexual
sex-ond asked whether there is a "fundamental right" to perform
it. - But the fundament of the right to privacy is not to be found
in the supposed fundamentality of what the law proscribes. It is to
be found in what the law imposes. The question, for example, of
whether the state should be permitted to compel an individual to have
a child--with all the pervasive, far-reaching, lifelong consequences
that child-bearing ordinarily entails--need not be the same as the
question of whether abortion or even child-bearing itself is a
"fundamental" act within some normative framework. The distinguishing
feature of the laws struck down by the privacy cases has been their
profound capacity to direct and to occupy individuals' lives through
their affirmative consequences. This affirmative power in the law,
5/ See, e.g., Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190 ("The issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy ...... ); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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lying just below its interdictive surface, must be privacy's focal
point.
I. A GENEALOGY OF PRIVACY
The right to privacy discussed here must not be confused
with the expectations of privacy secured by the fourth amendment or
with the right of privacy protected by tort law. In the latter two
contexts, the concept of privacy is employed to govern the conduct of
other individuals who intrude in various ways upon one's life.
Privacy in these contexts can be generally understood in its familiar
informational sense; it limits the ability of others to gain, dissem-
inate, or use information about oneself. By contrast, the right to
privacy that concerns us attaches to the rightholder's own actions.
It is not informational but substantive, immunizing certain conduct--
such as using contraceptives, marrying someone of a different color,
or aborting a pregnancy--from state proscription or penalty.
The emergence of this substantive right to privacy, and
hence the constitutional protection of the conduct to which it
applies, is6 7 f very recent origin. The doctrine is only some twenty
years old. - Its genealogy, however, extends as far back as consti-
tutional law reaches in this country. Indeed its most venerable
ancestor is the decision that rrdered constitutional law itself
possible: Marbury v. Madison. - Marbury is a progenitor of the
right-to-privacy decisions because it too belongs to the diverse
series of cases in which the Supreme Court has reached out beyond the
express language of the Constitution and struck down on constitutional
grounds some piece of federal or state legislation. A brief history
of this family of cases follows.
A. Pre-Privacy Case Law
The earliest and most authoritative articulation of the
idea that fundamental rights exist unspecified in the Constitution is
of course in the ninth amendment, which provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." The earliestjudicial statement of this idea followed soon after the Constitution
6/ The right to privacy was first announced in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra pp. 744-45.
7/ 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
was ratified. In Calder v. Bull, 
_/ Justice Chase advanced theproposition that legislation might be held invalid under natural law
even if the legislation does not violate any specific constitutional
principles or provisions. Justice Iredell, however, disagreed, and
his views have, at least ostensibly, prevailed. From the early
1800's to the present, the Court has generally paid lip service to
the idea that it should not use its constitutional power to invali-date legislation except where specific constitutional provisions
supply the principle of invalidity.
Yet the Court has never practiced what it preached.
Through one device or another, the Court has always managed to readinto the Constitution limits on legislative power that can hardly be
gathered from within that document's four corners. In the antebellum
period, the Court accomplished this task principally through ingeniousinterpretations of the contract clause, one of the few constitutional
provisions then applicable against the states. Thus, in Trustees of
Dartmouth Colleae v. Woodward, - the Court struck down New Hampshire's
attempt to gain legislative control over Dartmouth College; Dartmouth's
corporate charter was a "contract" for constitutional purposes, the
Court held, and the disputed law would have "impaired the obligations"
thereof.
After the Civil War, the passage of the fourteenth amendmentgave the Court a great deal more constitutional material to consider.
Curiously, the provision of that amendment containing what appear tobe the most explicit and potent substantive limitations on state
legislative powers--the privileges and immunities clause--proved too
much for the Court to swallow. In a series of early post-W /cases,
the Court gave an extremely narrow reading to that clause, - and
this reading remains in effect today. Instead, the Court seized on a
much more unlikely provision--the due process clause--for the strength
to take on the state legislatures.
Although the phrase "due process" might seem to pertain
only to procedural interests, the Court began to read substantive
guarantees into the clause as well. From the late 1870's to the turn
of the century, the Court formulated an interpretation of due processin which the predominant figure was a fundamental, potentially
1/ 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
9/ 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
10/ See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80
(1873).
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inviolate "liberty of contract" with which legislatures had no power
to interfere. l- Armed with this "liberty of contract," guaranteed
as a matter of substantive due process, the Court was prepared in
this century to do considerabl 29 amage to state economic regulations.
Thus, in Lochner v. New York, - the Court invalidated a maximum-hours
law for bakers on the ground that it interfered with "the freedom of
master and employee to contract." On similar grounds the Court later
condemned, example, prohibitions of anti-union clauses in labo
contracts, M price-fixing regulations of employment agencies, 
1-
and a fair-wage law for women. 15
In the same period, the Court also relied on the due
process clause to invalidate two staW laws regulating the education
of children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, - the Court held that a state
could not prohibit the teaching of foreign layqyages in elementary
school, and in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, - the Court struck
down a requirement that all children attend public school. Although
Meyer and Pierce resemble the other Lochner-era cases in analytic
form, in content they are closer to modern privacy case law. Indeed,
for reasons that will emerge more clearly below, these two cases may
be seen as the true parents of the privacy doctrine, and today they
are frequently classified together with other privacy decisions.
The climax of the Lochner-era jurisprudence was President
Franklin Roosevelt's retaliatory plan to increase the number of
Justices on the Supreme Court. Although the plan did not succeed as
designed, it apparently put sufficient pressure on the Court to
change the course of constitutional law. In West Coast Hotel Co. v.
11/ See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1897) (dicta);
Mupler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 134 (1877).
12/ 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13/ See, e.a., Coppace v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
14/ See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
15/ See Morehead v. New York ex rel. TiDaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
16/ 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17/ 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Parrish, W the Court renounced its freedom of contract/substantive
due process iujsprudence. A year later, in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., - the Court held that state economic regulations were
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. In the ensuing
decades, the Court repeatedly held that states were free to regulate
"their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their
laws do not run afoul of soi specific constitutional prohibition, or
of some valid federal law.
Even while repudiating its substantive due process juris-
prudence, however, the Court expressly noted that its newfo 9
self-restraint might not extend beyond the economic realm.
Indeed, in an important line of cases involving individual liberties
not overtly economic in nature, the Court has continued to strike
down state laws found to violate fundamental rights nowhere specified
in the Constitution. These cases elaborate the right-to-privacy
doctrine.
B. The Privacy Cases
The great peculiarity of the privacy cases is their predom-
inant, though not exclusive, focus on sexuality--not "sex" as such,
of course, but sexuality in the broad sense of that term: the
network of decisions and conduct relating to the conditions under
which sex is permissible, the social institutions surrounding sexual
relationships, and the procreative consequences of sex. Nothing in
the privacy cases says that the doctrine must gravitate around
sexuality. Nevertheless, it has.
The Court first announced the new Xivacy doctrine twenty-
four years ago in Griswold v. Connecticut. In Griswold the Court
invalidated statutes prohibiting the use and distribution of contra-
ceptive devices. Eschewing an approach explicitly grounded in
Lochnerian substantive due process, the Court stated that a "right to
18/ 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
19/ 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
2_0/ Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525, 536 (1949); . .
21/ See e.a., Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
22/ 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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privacy" could be discerned in the "penumbras" of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. This right included the freedom
of married couples to decide for themselves what to do in the "privacy"
of their bedrooms.
Two years later, in Loving v. Virginia, 23/ the Court
struck down a law criminalizing interracial marriage. The Court
ruled that states could not interfere in that manner with an individ-
ual's choice of whom to marry. On similar grounds, the Court also
invalidated W1s restricting the ability of poor persons to marry or
to divorce.
Although it remained possible after Loving to understand
the new privacy doctrine as limited (for s2 unelaborated reason) to
marital decisions, in Eisenstadt v. Baird the Court extended its
Griswold holding to protect the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons as well. "If the right to privacy means anything,"
the Court stated, "it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."
The next year, the Court took a further step from the
confines of marriage and delivered i most controversial opinion
since Brown v. Board of Education. - Justic 7 lackmun, with only
two Justices dissenting, wrote in Roe v. Wade - that the right to
privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." Subsequent cases have reaffirmed
Roe in the context of state efforts to "regulate" abortionwbut the
Court's support of Roe appears to be rapidly diminishing.
23/ 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
_& See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
25/ 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26/ 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27/ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28/ [See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. (1989);
decided after the original article was published.--Ed.]
The right to privacy was f V6her expanded in the 1977 case
of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, in which the Court struck
down a zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of dwelling units to
members of a nuclear family--the "nominal head of a household," his
or her spouse, and their parents and children. Although there was no
majority opinion, the four-Justice plurality expressly relied on the
Griswold line of cases, as well as Meyer and Pierce, emphasizing the
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."
The Court's Lost important recent privacy decision was
Bowers v. Hardwick, in which a 5-4 majority held that a state
could make homosexual sodomy a criminal offense without violating the
right to privacy. The Hardwick decision deserves a more detailed
treatment for two reasons. First, it may foretoken a considerable
narrowing of the privacy doctrine. Second, it vividly illustrates
the doctrine's current analytic difficulties.
C. Bowers v. Hardwick
Justice White, writing for the Court, began by announcing
that the issue presented was "whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."
So stated, the issue was for the majority literally a foregone
conclusion. Justice White's formulation was an expression of the
majority's constitutional instincts, and it served in this capacity
as a premise or interpretive canon in the ensuing discussion. The
Bill of Rights cannot be referring to that, after all, and therefore
we must interpret its provisions and our precedents accordingly. In
this way the Court's conclusion logically preceded its analysis.
The majority's first line of attack could portend dark days
for the privacy doctrine. Calls for extension of the doctrine,
Justice White stated, should be treated with great caution in order
to avoid the mere "imposition of the Justices' own choice of values
on the States." Indeed, the majority suggested, in its past privacy
decisions the Court had made fundamental normative decisions unmoored
from any constitutional anchoring. Justice White's clear intimation
was that such an injudicious and unjudicial practice would not be
continued here.
29/ 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
30/ 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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The difficulty with Justice White's way of putting matters
is that the Court in Hardwick necessarily drew a line: the right to
privacy stops here. That act of line-drawing was a quintessentially
normative judgment. Unless and until the Court repudiates the
privacy doctrine altogether, which it did not do in Hardwick, a
decision to draw the line here is nothing more than a judgment that
this particular activity is either less fundamental or more unsavory
than the activities protected in prior cases. Moreover, the expression
of this normative judgment in Hardwick is easy to find: it was the
first thing uttered--in Justice White's statement of the issue
presented, which so plainly expressed what I called his constitutional
instincts. Thus the Court's opening salvo, a formulation of the
issue calculated to shock the judicial conscience, directly compro-
mised its first line of attack--the argument that the judicial
conscience should be irrelevant.
Yet the majority knew very well that the case turned
ultimately on value judgments. For this reason, despite briefly
waving the standard of judicial objectivity, the majority proceeded
to give two arguments concerning the normative status of homosexuality.
First, cataloguing American criminal sodomy statutes from the eight-
eenth to the twentieth century, the majority argued that homosexual
sodomy is not supported by the country's historical and traditional
values. Second, Justice White suggested, homosexual sodomy cannot be
distinguished for doctrinal purposes from other forms of sexual
activity--adultery, incest, and so on--that no member of the Court is
yet prepared to constitutionalize. . .
The final aspect of the majority opinion to be noted here,
and the most important for present purposes, is its treatment of the
privacy precedents. Justice White stated that the Court's prior
cases have recognized three categories of activity protected by the
right to privacy: marriage, procreation, and family relationships.
According to Justice White, "homosexual activity" has "no connection"
to any of these three categories, and is therefore presumptively
outside the scope of the doctrine. For our purposes, the signifi-
cance of this argument lies in its evisceration of privacy's principle.
Justice White neither sought nor found any unifying principle
underlying his three categories. It was as if the Court had said,
"We in the majority barely understand why even these three areas are
constitutionally protected; we simply acknowledge them and note that
they are not involved here." There is thus no test derived from the
precedents with which the Court need evaluate the case of homosexuality.
There is no principle to be applied. In this sense, critics of
Justice White's opinion have been correct to call it "unprincipled."
The device of compartmentalizing precedent is an old
jurisprudential strategy for limiting unruly doctrines. The effect
here is that, after Hardwick, we know that the right to privacy
protects some aspects of marriage, procreation, and child-rearing,
but we do not know why. By identifying three disparate applications
ungrounded by any unifying principle, the majority effectively
severed the roots of the privacy doctrine, leaving only the branches,
which will presumably in short order dry up and wither away.
The dissenting opinions, unhappily, provided little reply
to the majority's systematic assault. Justice Blackmun, writing for
all four dissenters, first attempted to brush the majority's consti-
tutional instincts aside. "This case is no more about a 'fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy,'" the dissent began, "than
. . Katz v. United States was about a fundamental right to place
interstate bets from a telephone booth." Justice Blackmun's intuition--
that the majority's formulation of the issue somehow prejudged the
outcome--was correct. His statement, however, was plainly wrong.
Katz involved fourth amendment privacy. 3_!/ That sort of
privacy does make the claimant's substantive conduct irrelevant; at
issue is the government's manner of discovering the conduct. The new
right to privacy, as observed earlier, is not at heart informational.
It immunizes certain conduct regardless of whether or how it comes to
be discovered. To be sure, Justice Blackmun attempted to weave the
two kinds of privacy--substantive and informational--together in his
analysis of Georgia's sodomy statute. His opening formulation,
however, overlooked the critical point: in fourth amendment cases, a
court must resist the temptation to steal a glance at the claimant's
substantive conduct when deciding the constitutional issue; in
privacy cases, a court must resist the temptation to avert its eye.
The court has no choice but to look the conduct in its face--even if
society as a whole is content to react with hypocritical denial or
"instinctive" aversion--and take its measure. Griswold proved to be
very much about a right to use contraceptives rather than a right to
keep secret what one does in the bedroom, just as Roe is about the
right to have an abortion and Loving is about the right to marry
interracially. Justice Blackmun's initial hesitation is fatal; a
court prepared to strike down laws against homosexual sodomy must
first be prepared to look homosexuality in the eye.
Perhaps this hesitation accounts for the weakness of
Justice Blackmun's dissent when it finally comes round to articulating
a substantive privacy principle that would include the protection of
31/ See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that
the wiretapping of a public pay phone without a warrant violated the
caller's fourth amendment rights).
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homosexual sodomy. The opinion suggests that the state cannot bar
any form of "sexual intimacy." Such a holding would be obliged to
distinguish cases such as adultery and incest, which Justice Blackmun
tried gamely--but rather unsatisfactorily--to do. More importantly,
however, such a holding would have to explain why sexual intimacy in
its various forms rises to constitutional stature. What produces the
"fundamental" nature of homosexual or any other kind of sex?
On this point the dissent is disturbingly cursory and
vague. Justice Blackmun relied primarily on the role of sexual
relations in a person's "self-definition." Although the dissent
gives this concept scant elaboration, "self-definition" offers, in
the view of many, privacy's most promising principle. It is the
"personhood" principle and the subject of Part II of [the original]
Article.
What, then, is the right to privacy? What does it protect?
A number of commentators seem to think that they have it when they
add the word "autonomy" to the privacy vocabulary. But to call an
individual "autonomous" is simply another way of saying that he is
morally free, and to say that the right to privacy protects freedom
adds little to our understanding of the doctrine. To be sure, the
privacy doctrine involves the "right to make choices and decisions,"
which, it is said, forms the "kernel" of autonomy. The question,
however, is which choices and decisions are protected.
On this point the Court has offered little guidance. We
are told that privacy encompasses only, those "personal rights that
can be deeV "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"3- that it insulates decisions "important" to a person's
destiny, 33/ and that & applies to "matters . . . fundamentally
affecting a person." - Perhaps the best interpretation of these
formulations is that privacy is like obscenity: the Justices might
not be able to say what privacy is, but they know it when they see
32/ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); see also Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413
U.S. at 65 (quoting Roe).
33/ See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (holding that no
privacy right invalidates a law requiring establishment of a computer-
ized prescription registration system).
34/ Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
it. 2V How else can one explain the Court's aonishing introduction
of its pivotal holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird - with the phrase,
"If the riaht to privacy means anything, it means . ."?
That a doctrine might have to wait for a principle to
"catch up" with it is nothing new to common-lawmaking in general or
to constitutional lawmaking in particular. Yet a complete absence of
conceptualization cannot be maintained. To define "fundamental"
rights as those that cover matters "fundamentally affecting persons"
is less than entirely satisfactory. Can no more be said?
[Here follow Parts II and III devoted to Rubenfeld's
analysis of personhood and privacy.]
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDING
OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Privacy and Lochner
The right to privacy, in its constitutional incarnation,
was discovered in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of other constitu-
tional guarantees. The liberty of contract, in its day, was invoked
as a matter of "substantive due process." A devious irony is at work
in these phrases, as if a consciousness of the charade had inadver-
tently crept into the judicial language itself, announcing the one
doctrine as mystification and the other as oxymoron. Yet what drove
privacy into the penumbras, it should be recalled, was a perceived
need to differentiate the privacy doctrine from the language of
substantive due process. Unfortunately, this insecurity on privacy's
part--an identity complex no doubt--resulted in the very thing
feared; by resorting to shadows, the right to privacy has simply
invited critics to expose it--and to brand it, of course, with the
scarlet letter of Lochnerism.
A guilty conscience, however, is not necessarily proof of
the crime. To mock Justice Douglas' conjuring--as easy as that may
be--is plainly insufficient if the goal is to prove that, beneath the
35/ Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
36/ 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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magic words, privacy is Lochner all over again. There is too much
implicit constitutional law for that. The freedom of association,
the requirement that legislation be rational, the application of much
of the Bill of Rights to the states, and most fundamentally, the
disability of the political branches to be the final arbiters of the
scope of their own powers are all principles of implicit constitu-
tional law, but they are not all Lochner.
Thus privacy's critics are obliged to argue that within the
entire field of implicit constitutional law, the privacy doctrine and
Lochner share some common flaw. For privacy's proponents, on the
other hand, the point is to show what distinguishes privacy jurispru-
dence from the Lochner line of cases, and to show in the process,
without resort to penumbras or emanations, what gives privacy its
constitutional status.
One way to distinguish privacy from Lochner is to say that
the overruled Lochner era cases involved economic regulations. The
Lochner error, it might be said, was the failure to recognize that
the Constitution does not enact any particular economic theory; thus,
the repudiation of Lochner means only that courts cannot sit as
superlegislatures overseeing state or federal economic regulation.
In the privacy cases, the courts do no such thing.
This distinction betrays a superficial understanding of
both Lochner and privacy. The Lochner Court almost certainly did not
understand itself to be sitting as a superlegislature for economic
regulation, protecting American commerce or prosperity. In its own
eyes, the Lochner Court was not regulating economics; it was protecting
liberty--the liberty of contract. That a man was free to do as he
pleased with his own property--that is, property in which he had a
"vested right"--was axiomatic in the thinking of many at that time.
From this point of view, Lochner did not involve mere "economics" but
rather the most fundamental liberties of man against the state.
Some will reply, I suppose, that the Lochner Court's
conception of liberty or of its own decisionmaking is irrelevant.
The fact is, they will say, that the Lochner decisions did involve
economic matters. Even if liberty was at issue as well, the lesson
remains that liberty in the economic realm is simply not to be the
subject of implicit constitutional law.
Here, however, privacy's would-be proponents are revealing
a parallel misunderstanding of privacy doctrine itself. They are
perhaps imagining that privacy doctrine is limited to purely "private"--
perhaps simply sexual--matters. In fact, the right to privacy is
fully applicable to the economic realm. Suppose, for example, that a
law were passed for the purpose of rationalizing the economy, with
unimpeachable empirical evidence backing up its intended efficiencies,
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that subjected persons at an early age to a complex battery of exams,
the results of which were used to assign each individual to the most
appropriate educational track and the most productive occupation. It
seems certain to me that the right to privacy--clearly on an anti-
totalitarian principle, but even on a personhood principle--would not
permit the state to dictate its citizens' economic occupations. Our
unsophisticated privacy proponents, conceding this result, might now
wish to say: "But that's not economic regulation; it's a matter of
protecting liberty." We have just seen, however, that the very same
could have been said on behalf of Lochner. Thus the distinction
between economic and non-economic matters cannot serve us here.
Instead consider the following: the rights protected by
the Lochner doctrine were pre-political. Vested property rights and
the liberty of contract did not have to be explicitly protected by
the Constitution because, in the Lochnerian view, they existed
outside the Constitution. They pre-existed the Constitution.
Indeed, these rights antedated the formation of society itself.
Property was the reason why men instituted government, and contract
was the means by which they did so. 7
There is nothing pre-political in the right to privacy. If
the kind of creeping totalitarianism that I have described is a
danger to us, it is so solely because of our commitment to democracy--
to a set of political values. The right to privacy, as I have sought
to elucidate it, became a right only at the moment when we constituted
ourselves as a democratic polity. For this reason the right to
privacy is not, like the rights protected under Lochner, extraneous
to the Constitution. It does not purport to antedate the Constitution
or to arise from a source, such as the "social contract," superior in
authority to the Constitution. The right to privacy is a constitu-
tional right because the Constitution is the document that establishes
democracy in this country.
The right to privacy is a political doctrine. It does not
exist because individuals have a sphere of "private" life with which
the state has nothing to do. The state has everything to do with our
private life; and the freedom that privacy protects equally extends,
as we have seen, into "public" as well as "private" matters. The
right to privacy exists because democracy must impose limits on the
37/ This formulation refers to the classical liberal description of
the emergence of civil society out of the state of nature. See
T. Hobbes, Leviathan ch. XVII, at 173-77 (J. Plamenatz ed. 1963) (1st
ed. 1651); J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government chs. VIII-IX,
at 49-66 (J. Gough rev. ed. 1976) (3d ed. 1698); . .
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extent of control and direction that the state exercises over the
day-to-day conduct of individual lives.
B. Totalitarianism and Constitutional Interpretation
A "transcendental" doctrine of constitutional law, in the
Kantian sense of that word, would be a doctrine necessary to the very
possibility of the particular form of government constituted in a
given society. Under our form of government, constitutional democracy,
there are, I believe, two such doctrines.
The first derives from the principle that the meaning of
constitutional protections may not be finally established by those
governmental actors against whom those protections are chiefly
directed. It it were, the Constitution would in reality be without
meaning. Its protections, in form unchanged, would in fact be wholly
illusory. This is the principle on which the doctrine of Marbury v.
Madison rests.
Accountability to the constitutional text, however, is but
one of two necessary modes by which the state's power is ultimately
limited in our form of government. The other is accountability to
the people. Yet just as the political branches, in the absence of
Marbury, could bend the Constitution into a serviceable and pliant
shape, so government, in the absence of a privacy doctrine, could
similarly shape the lives of its citizens. The very possibility of
accountability to a people presupposes that the bodies and minds of
the citizenry are not to be too totally conditioned by the state that
the citizenry is meant to be governing. If they were, self-government,
although it might continue to exist in form, would in fact be wholly
illusory.
People do not meaningfully govern themselves if their lives
are subtly but pervasively molded into standard, rigid, normalized
roles. They simply reproduce themselves and their social institu-
tions. A people may of course choose to reproduce their state; but
they must be free in order to choose to do so. At a certain point,
state control over the quotidian, material aspects of individuals'
lives--even where the people have democratically imposed such control
themselves--deprives them of this freedom. Thus, the second tran-
scendental doctrine of our constitutional law is given by the anti-
totalitarian principle with which I have tried to explain the right
to privacy.
It will likely be replied that the laws invalidated by the
right to privacy, as I have developed it, have no such thoroughgoing
conditioning effects that would deprive people of the ability to
exercise their democratic freedom. Laws against abortion, it will be
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said, in no way impede women from exercising their suffrage; nor do
laws against homosexual sex impede homosexuals from doing the same.
To put things this way is similar to criticizing applica-
tions of the first amendment on the ground that proscribing a partic-
ular bit of speech will not genuinely threaten the democratic process
or that permitting a particular governmental expression of faith will
not genuinely establish religion. More than this, however, the laws
implicated by the right to privacy do indeed have a discernible
conditioning effect that should not be overlooked. The centuries-long
prohibitions of contraception and abortion, precisely by assuring
that women's lives would be substantially taken up with the functions
of child-bearing, must have made it difficult, if not impossible, for
many women to discover or to assert their political will and for men
and women alike to reconceive women's societal role. Similarly, the
prohibition of homosexual sex has contributed to our evolution into a
society that looks upon "homosexuals" as a distinct species of
person, as opposed to a society in which individuals have a less
rigid sexual orientation. Hence, saying that homosexuals remain free
to exercise their suffrage in an attempt to overturn anti-homosexual
laws begs the question. A similar point could be made with respect
to laws forbidding interracial marriage.
The same cannot be said, however, of the laws struck down
in the Lochner era, because these laws did not involve the forced,
affirmative occupation and direction of individuals' lives. Modern
Lochnerians may feel that minimum wage or maximum rent laws are an
illegitimate taking of property; they may even feel that such laws
represent an outrageous deprivation of individual liberty. But these
laws do not positively take over and redirect lives. They do not
threaten forcibly to condition the totality of an individual's
existence.
Finally, consider again our hypothetical law by which
government would dictate the vocation of each individual. Imagine,
for a moment, the unlikely but conceivable successes of such a law:
the order it might produce, the sense of satisfaction each individual
might obtain by knowing his place in society, the decrease in crime,
and the nationwide gains in productivity. Despite all this, is there
anyone who doubts that the Constitution must forbid such a law? The
source of this "must," however, is far from clear. Perhaps one might
invoke the thirteenth amendment or a right of "self-expression"
embodied in the first amendment. But these gropings in the constitu-
tional text would be disingenuous. It is the possibility of democracy
itself that requires an anti-totalitarian principle.
In the eighteenth century, the Constitution applied almost
exclusively to the federal government, and it was quite unclear to
wh t extent the federal government would be able to operate directly119
on the daily lives of the citizenry. State governments were thought
to be the chief holders of that power. It was, moreover, probably
unthinkable at that time that governmental power could develop
technologies and institutions of potentially total control over the
shape and purposes of citizens' lives. Now the scope of federal
legislative power has become clear; now the Constitution has come to
be the protector of fundamental liberties against state governments
as well; and now governmental power has so expanded that it affirma-
tively shapes our lives with the potential for total control. The
effect of these developments has been to compel a new articulation--in
the form of the right to privacy--of what is the most abecedarian
tenet of self-government: that government must exist for the people,
and the people must not become mere instruments of the state. This
tenet necessitates, I have tried to show, a right to be let alone, if
by "let alone" we understand the right not to have the course of
one's life dictated by the state.
